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 Legal Pluralism and International 
Human Rights Law: A Multifaceted 
Relationship 
 ELLEN  DESMET 1 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 THIS CHAPTER ANALYSES some characteristics of the relationship between international human rights law and the concept of legal plu-ralism at two levels. The fi rst part provides some theoretical refl ec-
tions on the linkages between human rights, international human rights law 
and legal pluralism. The use of the term  ‘ legal pluralism ’ in relation to ever-
smaller bodies of law, such as international human rights law itself, then 
leads to some refl ections as to where this process may bring us. A distinction 
is proposed between  ‘ legal pluralism ’ , as referring to the simultaneous appli-
cability of various normative systems in a given social fi eld, and  ‘ applying a 
legal pluralist perspective ’ to the study of the simultaneous applicability of 
norms originating from the same normative (sub)system. 
 The second part of the chapter further explores the relationship between 
legal pluralism as a social phenomenon and international human rights law 
on the basis of a concrete issue, namely the land, territorial and resource 
rights of indigenous peoples. How does the empirical fact of legal pluralism 
interplay with the emergence and implementation of human rights standards 
in the domain of indigenous land, territorial and resource rights ? It will be 
also highlighted that the relationship between substantive provisions in inter-
national human rights law, on the one hand, and norms of other legal orders, 
42  Ellen Desmet
on the other, may go in various, parallel or opposing, directions. In this way, 
the richness and variability of possible relations between various normative 
orders are illustrated, defying any unidimensional characterisations of nor-
mative orders as regards a particular issue — for instance, of human rights 
law as supporting indigenous land and resource claims  ‘ all the way ’ . 
 2. ABOUT LEGAL PLURALISM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 2.1. Legal Pluralism in Sociolegal Scholarship 
 Franz von Benda-Beckmann (2002: 72) has noted that there is  ‘ little uni-
formity in the conceptualisation of  … legal pluralism ’ . This is partly because 
the concept of legal pluralism has been employed across various disciplines, 
including anthropology, sociology and legal science (ibid: 73). In the socio-
legal literature, the concept of legal pluralism is most commonly understood 
as referring to  ‘ a situation in which two or more legal systems coexist in 
the same social fi eld ’ (Merry 1988: 870) or, in a similar vein,  ‘ the coexist-
ence of different normative orders within one socio-political space ’ (von 
Benda-Beckmann 1997: 1). These normative orders may coexist indepen-
dently from one another, each with their own basis of legitimacy. This has 
been named  ‘ strong ’ legal pluralism (Griffi ths 1986) or  ‘ wild ’ legal plural-
ism (von Benda-Beckmann 2006: 59), standing in contrast to  ‘ weak ’ legal 
pluralism (Griffi ths 1986). In the latter case, the functioning of a certain 
normative system is dependent upon its recognition by another normative 
order — often, but not necessarily, the state legal system. 
 De Sousa Santos prefers the expression  ‘ plurality of legal orders ’ over 
 ‘ legal pluralism ’ , because the latter term has in his view a normative under-
tone and seems to imply that there is something  ‘ inherently good, progres-
sive or emancipatory ’ about legal pluralism, which he contests (de Sousa 
Santos 2002: 89). As an example, he refers to the repressive legal orders 
established by paramilitary groups in territories under their control. Other 
authors, working on gender issues, have preferred the term  ‘ legal plurali-
ties ’ , considering that this term  ‘ best evokes the fl uid, multilayered, con-
tradictory and transnational forms of legal ordering that shape women ’ s 
life prospects today ’ (Sieder et al 2013: 1) or  ‘ plural legalities ’ (Hellum 
et al 2007). Notwithstanding the different denominations, they all refer to 
a multiplicity of forms of normative ordering that simultaneously apply to 
a particular social fi eld. In that sense, they do not fundamentally seem to 
differ from one another, even though the term legal pluralism may evoke 
somewhat more the impression of  ‘ discrete ’ ,  ‘ separate ’ legal orders, whereas 
the notions of  ‘ legal pluralities ’ and  ‘ plural legalities ’ emphasise more the 
fl uidity and intersection of these forms of ordering. In the latter vein, de 
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 2  Quane (2013: 677) notes that  ‘ when viewed in conjunction with a state ’ s national law, the 
very existence of international human rights law represents a particular form of legal plural-
ism ’ . In her exploration of the relationship between international human rights law and legal 
pluralism, she seems to limit herself to a  ‘ weak ’ conception of legal pluralism (cf Griffi ths 
1986), namely aiming to  ‘ explore the extent to which a state ’ s acceptance  de facto or  de jure 
of religious and/or customary law within its territory is compatible with the requirements of 
international human rights law ’ (Quane 2013: 677 – 78). 
Sousa Santos (2002: 437) has coined the term  ‘ interlegality ’ to indicate 
 ‘ different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed in our 
minds, as much as in our actions ’ . 
 2.2. Legal Pluralism, Human Rights and International Human Rights Law 
 Legal pluralism and human rights are at fi rst sight  ‘ strange bedfellows ’ , as 
M é gret (2013: 69) has noted: human rights are inherently normative in 
nature, whereas the concept of legal pluralism usually refers to a social fact 
of multiple legal orders coexisting in the same sociopolitical space. Legal 
pluralism and human rights are thus not  ‘ conceptual analogues ’ (Provost 
et al 2013: 1). 
 I understand one of the objectives of this volume to be to try to describe 
and explain under which circumstances human rights may be realised in a 
world characterised by the simultaneous applicability of multiple normative 
systems in a given social fi eld. As will be illustrated below regarding indig-
enous land, territorial and resource rights, the relationship between human 
rights and legal pluralism is ambivalent and context dependent: a legally 
plural situation on the ground may contribute or not to the realisation of 
human rights, depending on the specifi c circumstances and the interpreta-
tion and application of both human rights standards and other norms. 
 A key role in the realisation of human rights is — or should be — played by 
international human rights  law , ie the codifi cation of human rights in inter-
national legal instruments. From a human rights perspective, international 
human rights law is an important vehicle for the protection and promotion 
of human rights, one that has been specifi cally designed for and is supposed 
to be exclusively dedicated to this goal. This does not imply that the applica-
tion of international human rights law is the only way of realising human 
rights. Human rights may also be respected, protected and fulfi lled through 
the functioning of other legal systems, such as state law, other branches of 
international law (eg international humanitarian law or international crimi-
nal law) or non-state legal orders. Non-legal ways to enhance human rights 
include the use of media, political action and social mobilisation. Human 
rights may thus have considerable impact even when they are not mobilised 
as  ‘ law ’ (Merry et al 2010). 
 From a legal pluralist perspective, international human rights law is one 
of the legal orders that is applicable today in practically every social fi eld. 2 
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Tamanaha (2008: 397 – 400) has broadly identifi ed six systems of normative 
ordering: offi cial or positive legal systems; customary normative systems; 
religious normative systems; economic/capitalist normative systems; func-
tional normative systems and community/cultural normative systems. He 
considers  ‘ human rights ’ as one type of offi cial legal systems, next to, among 
others, state law and European Union law. Given his characterisation of 
offi cial legal systems as  ‘ linked to an institutionalised legal apparatus of 
some kind;  … manifested in legislature, enforcement agencies, tribunals ’ 
(ibid: 397), I submit that he actually intends to refer to human rights  law 
instead of human rights as such. 
 The place of  ‘ human rights (law) ’ in the scheme of Tamanaha as one type 
of offi cial legal system already points to the fact that normative systems 
usually consist of different subsystems. This can be observed at various, 
and ever smaller, levels. For instance, offi cial legal systems can roughly be 
divided into international law, regional law (eg of the European Union, the 
African Union and the Organisation of American States), national/federal 
state law, and various lower levels of offi cial law depending on the state 
structure (eg provincial law and municipal law). International law itself also 
consists of multiple subsystems. International human rights law is, then, one 
of these subsystems, next to, among others, international humanitarian law, 
international criminal law, international environmental law, and interna-
tional trade and investment law. Often, various subsystems of international 
law will apply concurrently, such as international environmental law and 
international investment law (see eg Onana 2012). 
 International human rights law is not a uniform system either. It is itself 
multilayered, consisting of a global system (United Nations) and various 
regional human rights systems, and has diversifi ed towards specifi c catego-
ries of people (women, children, persons with disabilities, migrant workers, 
minorities, indigenous peoples, etc) and themes (torture, discrimination, etc) 
(Brems 2014). In recent years, the concept of  ‘ legal pluralism ’ seems to be 
increasingly used also to refer to this diversity  within a particular legal sys-
tem or subsystem (see eg, as regards international law, Burke-White 2004). 
According to Twining (2010: 513), in the literature on global legal plural-
ism, the term  ‘ pluralism ’ has moreover  ‘ sometimes been extended to encom-
pass other referents ’ , such as the proliferation of actors in international 
relations, and the diversifi cation of supranational courts and tribunals as 
well as norm-creating agencies. 
 2.3. The Smallest Constitutive Element ? 
 The use of the concept of legal pluralism to refer to normative diversity 
within ever-smaller bodies of law as well as to other referents brings us to the 
question of where this process may lead us. Is it possible, desirable and/or 
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 3  And specifi cally with respect to human rights:  ‘ The idea of  “ pluralism ” applied to  … the 
proliferation of human rights means little more than diversity ’ (Twining 2010: 516). 
necessary to identify a smallest constitutive element to be able to speak of 
 ‘ legal pluralism ’ in an analytical sense ? Without wanting to essentialise the 
concept or being picky about labels, I would argue that this tendency of 
opening up the concept of legal pluralism very widely may lead to vagueness 
or confusion as to the characteristics that are generally associated with it, at 
least in sociolegal scholarship. In this sense, I concur with Twining (2010: 
513) when he notes: 
 If  ‘ legal pluralism ’ merely means more than one legal phenomenon without limit 
on the kinds of phenomenon referred to, it is doubtful whether it is a useful con-
cept and whether the heritage of mainstream socio-legal literature on legal plural-
ism up to 1990 is very helpful in interpreting these very varied topics. 3 
 One of the most commonly shared distinctive features of legal pluralism 
within the sociolegal literature is the simultaneous applicability of different 
normative  ‘ orders ’ or  ‘ systems ’ , as referred to above. A legal system in the 
analytical sense has been described by von Benda-Beckmann (1997: 8) as 
 ‘ the totality of legal phenomena generated and maintained in a given social 
unit ’ . He continues: 
 I speak of an empirical legal system when the  same basis of ultimate validity is 
asserted for a body of law. Thus we can speak of state law, religious law, or tradi-
tional law, when state, religion or tradition refer to the ultimate basis on which the 
validity of the legal conceptions is grounded and which unifi es the set of sources 
of valid law. (ibid, emphasis added) 
 Different legal systems thus originate in different sources of authority and 
are consequently often characterised by other underlying principles (eg legal 
certainty, reciprocity, harmony). This may lead to diverse ways of decision-
making (eg democratic, autocratic, consensual) and of confl ict resolution 
(eg confl ict avoidance, mediation, adjudication). It was these fundamental 
disparities between legal systems as well as their interaction that triggered 
the interest of legal anthropologists. 
 Various authors have noted, however, that the requirement of a  ‘ system ’ 
should not be interpreted as a  conditio sine qua non or in a too restric-
tive manner, in order to be able to speak of legal pluralism. According to 
von Benda-Beckmann (ibid):  ‘ Apart from such  “ system ” law, in which the 
systems are named, there may be also  “ unnamed law ” , law not attributed 
to a system but, for instance, to the asserted self-regulatory autonomy of 
people. ’ Tamanaha (2008: 399) has noted in relation to community/cultural 
normative systems that  ‘ [i]n its thinnest manifestation (which can nonethe-
less exert a powerful infl uence), the norms that bind and defi ne the commu-
nity may not be defi nite or reiterated enough to be considered a  “ system ” in 
the same sense that that applies to the other categories ’ . This suggests that 
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the conceptualisation of  ‘ system ’ should not be too strict, in order not to 
exclude such more fl uid or vague community/cultural normative systems. 
 Not only do various norms within a certain legal system share their  ‘ basis 
of ultimate validity ’ (von Benda-Beckmann 1997: 8), within the subsystem 
of international human rights law, these norms also share the objective of 
promoting and protecting human rights. There is no universally accepted 
understanding or defi nition of  ‘ human rights ’ : human rights mean different 
things for different people and the particular interpretation of the content 
of certain rights will vary with the context and situation. But at least there 
is some consensus on basic tenets and principles relating to, for instance, the 
goal of human dignity, the protection of the right to life and the prohibi-
tion of torture. Certain rules of other normative systems may be grounded, 
however, in fundamentally different aspirations, such as the perpetuation of 
a patriarchal society, the dominance of a particular religious worldview, or 
monetary gain. The potential clash between different systems of normative 
ordering will thus be greater when analysing the interaction between two 
normative orders that do not belong to a same  ‘ mother ’ order than when 
looking at issues that relate to the diversity and divergence within a certain 
normative (sub)system, such as international human rights law. 
 If one, however, broadens the conceptualisation of legal pluralism towards 
the simultaneous applicability of legal norms that originate within the same 
 ‘ (sub)system ’ , then one comes on a ground with which doctrinal lawyers 
are also familiar, be it mostly in relation to state or supranational law: that 
of confl icting rules within one system. Since such rules belong to the same 
system, there is no clash between the ultimate authority and fundamental 
principles in which these rules are grounded. Mechanisms, institutions and 
rules have been devised within normative systems to deal with this kind 
of confl ict. In state law, for instance, a hierarchy of norms has been estab-
lished, and principles such as  lex posterior derogat legi priori and  lex spe-
cialis derogat legi generali are applied. In international law, the distinction 
between hard law and soft law may moreover be relevant (Hespel et al 
2012). In addition, in customary normative systems, rules of prioritisation 
or principles that facilitate or indicate how to arrive at a decision in the 
case of confl icting rules will often be in place. An example constitutes the 
principle within the Andean community that harmony is the ultimate goal 
of dispute resolution or management (Drzewieniecki 1995: 8). 
 An overly broad conceptualisation of legal pluralism thus does not seem 
particularly useful for analytical purposes. It may therefore make sense to 
distinguish between  ‘ legal pluralism ’ (as referring to the coexistence of dif-
ferent normative systems or other bodies of law, such as unnamed law, in 
a particular social fi eld) and  ‘ applying a legal pluralist perspective ’ to the 
study of the simultaneous applicability of various norms within one legal 
(sub)system. Applying a legal pluralist perspective then implies drawing 
on the insights of the fi eld of legal pluralism to explain the dynamics and 
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manage the internal plurality of a particular (sub)system of law. Oomen 
(2014), for instance, has employed insights from the fi eld of legal pluralism 
to increase our understanding of the multilayeredness of human rights law. 
 3. INDIGENOUS LAND, TERRITORIAL AND RESOURCE RIGHTS 
 In what follows, the relationship between international human rights law 
and legal pluralism is further analysed in the concrete domain of the land, 
territorial and resource rights of indigenous peoples. Two main scenarios 
may be analytically distinguished. First, as regards a particular issue, inter-
national human rights law and another normative order may stand, to a 
greater or lesser extent, in opposition to each other. Here, human rights law 
can be invoked against those rules of the other normative order that seem 
to violate human rights. Second, human rights law and another normative 
order may be aligned on particular themes, defending similar values, inter-
ests and rights. In this case, human rights law and the other normative order 
may be mutually reinforcing. This second scenario seems to have received 
less scholarly attention, as research more readily focuses on confl icting legal 
systems than on reciprocally supportive systems (see also Twining 2009: 27). 
In practice, the two scenarios will often occur together, in that standards of 
international human rights law and another legal order may strengthen each 
other on a particular issue (scenario two) to the detriment of norms origi-
nating within one or more other legal orders (scenario one). The extent to 
which international human rights law is supported or challenged by another 
normative system will also depend on the interpretation that is given to both 
human rights standards and the other norms involved. 
 Without denying the possible presence and impact of a variety of other 
forms of normative ordering in a concrete situation, such as religious law, 
project law (see eg Weilenmann 2009), or other branches of international 
law, the remainder of this chapter mainly focuses on the interplay between 
three legal orders: local (indigenous/customary) law, state law and interna-
tional human rights law. These normative orders are among the most relevant 
ones to assess the interplay between international human rights law and legal 
pluralism in the domain of indigenous land, territorial and resource rights. 
The selection of and principal focus on the three levels of local, national and 
international may be justifi ed by referring to the distinction made by de Sousa 
Santos (1987: 287) of  ‘ three different legal spaces and their correspondent 
forms of law: local, national and world legality ’ . He notes that these legal 
orders often have the same object of regulation, here the rights of indige-
nous peoples to their lands, territories and natural resources. In his symbolic 
cartography of law, de Sousa Santos links these three legal orders to three 
different  ‘ scales ’ :  ‘ Local law is a  large-scale legality . Nation state law is a 
 medium-scale legality . World law is a  small-scale legality ’ (ibid). He illustrates 
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this distinction with the example of a labour confl ict. Within a local legality 
such as a factory code, the prevention and management of labour confl icts 
stand central and are regulated in great detail, similar to when a large carto-
graphic scale is used. Within national state labour law, the labour confl ict is 
only one aspect of a broader reality of industrial relations. Within the world 
legality of, for instance, international franchising, the labour confl ict becomes 
a minor, almost negligible detail. Because of their different scale, these differ-
ent legal orders thus create different legal realities, based on the same social 
object. However,  ‘ in real socio-legal life the different legal scales do not exist 
in isolation but rather interact in different ways ’ (ibid: 288). 
 3.1. International Human Rights Law  ‘ versus ’ Other Normative Orders 
 In the fi rst scenario, international human rights law is invoked against 
norms or practices grounded in another legal order that appear to constitute 
human rights violations. Since states are the primary duty-bearers in inter-
national law, state law should, or at least could, be an important vehicle of 
implementation of human rights. Frequently, however, it is state law that 
goes against human rights, even though implicitly, subtly or at a lower legal 
level than the constitutional one, where fundamental rights and freedoms 
are formally entrenched (see eg Desmet 2011b). 
 As such, international human rights law has been used by indigenous peo-
ples against actions grounded in the state legal system, such as the unilat-
eral establishment by the state of protected areas situated in their ancestral 
territories. This drawing upon international human rights law to contest 
state conservation has been a gradual evolution. To start, during the past 
decades, international human rights law has become the primary vehicle 
for indigenous peoples to claim recognition of and respect for their rights 
at the international level. This was not always the case: the turn to human 
rights by the indigenous rights movement was prompted by a rejection at 
the international level of their claims of self-determination (Engle 2011). 
Moreover, within the human rights framework, attention to the potentially 
negative consequences of externally induced conservation initiatives has 
only recently increased (Campese et al 2007). In contrast to the general 
relationship between human rights and the environment, the particular link 
between human rights and nature conservation appeared later on the radar 
of the human rights community. Only in the past few years have violations 
of indigenous peoples ’ human rights been found to be explicitly caused by 
the establishment of state-protected areas, and this both within the African 
and the Inter-American human rights system. 
 A landmark case on the relationship between indigenous rights and 
nature conservation is the  Endorois decision, adopted in 2009 by the African 
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 4  Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya)  & Minority Rights Group International 
on behalf of the Endorois Welfare Council Case , African Commission on Human and Peoples ’ 
Rights, Communication 276/2003, 27th Activity Report (November 2009). 
 5  African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 
21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter). 
 6  X á kmok K á sek Indigenous Community Case (Merits, Reparations, and Costs Judgment), 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 214 (24 August 2010). In the case of 
 Salvador Chiriboga v Ecuador , the Court addressed the relationship between protected areas 
and the right to property of  non-indigenous persons.  Salvador Chiriboga Case (Preliminary 
Objection and Merits Judgment), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 179 
(6 May 2008). 
Commission on Human and Peoples ’ Rights. 4 The Endorois, a semi-nomadic 
indigenous community of about 60,000 people, had for centuries been living 
in the Lake Bogoria area in Kenya. In 1973, the Kenyan government superim-
posed a protected area, the Lake Hannington Game Reserve (later renamed 
the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve), on their ancestral lands. This gazettement 
led to the forced eviction of the Endorois, without appropriate compensation. 
Moreover, their access to the Lake Bogoria area, necessary for their pastoral 
lifestyle and cultural integrity, was denied. After recognising the Endorois 
as an indigenous people, the African Commission found a violation of the 
 Endorois ’ right to practise religion (Article 8), the right to property (Article 14), 
the right to culture (Article 17(2) and (3)), the right to dispose freely of their 
natural resources (Article 21) and the right to development (Article 22) of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ Rights. 5 The Endorois case has been 
most commonly applauded because it is the fi rst case in which the African 
Commission has pronounced on the defi nition of indigenous peoples and on 
their rights to land and natural resources. Moreover, it is also the fi rst time 
that an international tribunal has found a violation of the right to develop-
ment, since the African Charter is the only international treaty enshrining a 
right to development (Ashamu 2011: 302). I would like to stress, however, 
that this is also the fi rst supranational case in which violations of indige-
nous peoples ’ rights were directly linked to and caused by externally induced 
nature conservation initiatives, namely the creation of a protected area by the 
state on indigenous territory and the subsequent forced eviction. 
 In August 2010, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its turn, 
issued its fi rst judgment in a conservation-related case regarding indigenous 
peoples, namely  X á kmok K á sek Indigenous Community v Paraguay . 6 In 
2008, a private nature reserve was declared for a period of fi ve years, par-
tially on land claimed by the X á kmok K á sek Indigenous Community. The 
creation of the protected area took place without consulting the members of 
the community or taking into account their territorial claims ( § 80). It pre-
vented the community members from carrying out their traditional activities 
on that land, such as hunting, fi shing and gathering, and impeded the expro-
priation and occupation of the land under any other condition ( § 82). The 
action on unconstitutionality fi led by the community to redress the situation 
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 7  American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 
18 July 1978), 1144 UNTS 123, OAS Treaty Series No 36 (1969) (American Convention). 
 8  The Kali ñ a and Lokono Peoples (Suriname) (Merits Report), Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights Report No 79/13, Case 12.639 (18 July 2013)  § 167(3). 
 9  Gar í funa Community of  ‘ Triunfo de la Cruz ’ and its members (Honduras) (Merits Report), 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No 76/12, Case 12.548 (7 November 
2012)  § 266, see also  § 294(2). The Gar í funa people are the result of cultural syncretism 
between indigenous and African peoples. They have asserted their rights in Honduras as an 
indigenous people; their indigenous character was not contested by the state in this case. There-
fore, the Inter-American Commission analysed the case taking into account the Inter-American 
jurisprudence on indigenous peoples ’ rights. ibid  § § 190 – 91. 
 10  Gar í funa Community of Cayos Cochinos and its members (Honduras) (Admissibility 
Decision), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No 39/07, Petition 1118-03 
did not achieve any result. Consequently, the Court found a violation of 
the rights to communal property (Article 21(1)), judicial guarantees (Article 
8(1)) and judicial protection (Article 25(1)) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, 7 in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, to the detriment 
of the members of the X á kmok K á sek Community. The contribution of 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, is noteworthy. In his expert testimony, he stated: 
 [T]he said declaration as a protected wooded area could constitute a new and 
sophisticated mechanism adopted by the private owners of land claimed by indig-
enous communities  ‘ to obstruct the land claims of the original peoples  … using 
legal mechanisms and even invoking purposes as virtuous as the conservation of 
the environment. ’ ( § 169) 
 In two other cases concerning the impact of protected areas on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, judgments of the Inter-American Court are pending. In 
its merits report on the case of the Kali ñ a and Lokono peoples, the Inter-
American Commission concluded that the State of Suriname violated the 
Kali ñ a and Lokono peoples ’ property rights by  ‘ establishing and maintain-
ing the Wia Wia, Galibi and Wane Kreek Reserves  … without conducting a 
consultation process aimed at obtaining their free, prior and informed con-
sent according to Inter-American standards ’ . 8 Similarly, although with less 
weight attached to the conservation initiative, in the case of the Gar í funa 
Community of Triunfo de la Cruz, the Commission concluded that the State 
of Honduras had violated Article 21 of the American Convention, because 
it had failed to ensure the effective participation of the community and its 
members in measures affecting their territory. 9 One of these measures was 
the establishment of the Punta Izopo National Park, which restricted access 
to the area and consequently prevented the community from carrying out 
its traditional cultural practices ( § 264). A third case concerning the adverse 
consequences of the establishment and management of a protected area 
without carrying out proper consultations, namely in relation to the 
 Gar í funa Community of Cayos Cochinos, was declared admissible by the 
Inter-American Commission in 2007. 10 
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(24 July 2007). A part of the original complaint, concerning acts of physical aggression by 
soldiers in charge of monitoring the environment on the archipelago of Cayos Cochinos, was 
broken down into a separate petition, which was declared admissible in 2013.  Jes ú s Flores Sat-
uye and Others (Honduras) (Admissibility Decision). Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Report No 93/13, Petition 1063-07 (4 November 2013). 
 11  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN General Assembly Res 61/295 
( 13 September 2007 ) . 
 12  Convention (No 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries (adopted 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991) International Labour Con-
ference (ILO Convention 169). 
 International human rights law can also be invoked against state law 
without having recourse to judicial avenues, for instance in negotiation pro-
cesses with the local or national government. An example constitutes the 
categorisation process of a provisional protected area, the G ü epp í Reserved 
Zone situated in the extreme north of the Peruvian Amazon. In this case, the 
ancestral habitants of that area, the Airo Pa i , successfully invoked their right 
to be adequately consulted, which led to a new consultation round more 
in accordance with international human rights standards (Desmet 2011a: 
600 – 10). 
 3.2.  International Human Rights Law in Alliance with Other 
Normative Orders 
 The second scenario relates to situations in which international human rights 
law and other normative orders fi nd themselves  ‘ on the same line ’ , and may 
thus be mutually reinforcing in a legally plural world. Again, this may be 
the case for human rights law in relation to any other normative system. 
A common perception is that local (indigenous/customary) law — as often 
based on  ‘ traditions ’ — tends to fi t uneasily with international human rights 
standards. There are various areas, however, where customary and commu-
nity normative orders are in line with or endorsed by current international 
human rights law. This is to a large extent the case for the land, territorial 
and resource rights of indigenous peoples, which have been recognised in 
international human rights law as based on customary normative systems. 
This is evident from Article 26 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples, 11 the jurisprudence within the Inter-American and African 
human right system, and — especially as far land and territorial rights are 
concerned — from ILO Convention 169 (Articles 13 – 15). 12 Regarding indig-
enous land, territorial and resource rights, it is most often state law that 
stands in contrast with both international human rights and indigenous/
customary law. Peruvian state legislation, for example, only awards limited 
lots of  land to peasant and native  communities , instead of recognising the 
 territories of indigenous  peoples . This approach contains two fundamental 
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 13  Constitution of Peru 1993, Art 89. The peasant communities ( comunidades campesinas ) 
are mostly found in the Andes and coastal region, the native communities ( comunidades 
 nativas ) in the Amazon. 
 14  ILO Convention 169, Art 13(2). See also below. 
fl aws. First, the Peruvian constitution does not recognise the legal subject 
of indigenous  ‘ peoples ’ , but only attributes rights to  ‘ communities ’ (compa-
rable to villages). 13 This has implied a fragmentation of the Peruvian indig-
enous peoples into various legal persons (Desmet 2011a: 372 – 77). The Airo 
Pa i people, for instance, are divided into four offi cially registered native 
communities and one village that has not been legally recognised. Second, 
the Peruvian legislation does not incorporate the concept of  ‘ territory ’ , 
which goes beyond the concept of land and  ‘ covers the total environment 
of the areas which [indigenous peoples] occupy or otherwise use ’ . 14 Only 
limited lots of land are given in title to the peasant and native communities 
(Desmet 2011a: 378 – 88). The land titles of the four Airo Pai native com-
munities cover only a fraction of their ancestral territory. Peruvian state law 
qualifi es the remainder of the Airo Pa i territory, which includes their ances-
tors ’ cemeteries and various historically and culturally important sites, as 
 ‘ state land ’ . Such an approach goes against both international human rights 
law and the customary normative systems of the peoples concerned. 
 There thus seems to be a shift in alliance, at least as far the rights of 
indigenous peoples are concerned. Whereas international law historically 
has served to legitimise the colonisation of indigenous peoples, support-
ing the efforts of the nation states involved in this endeavour, international 
human rights law has become increasingly receptive towards accommodat-
ing indigenous peoples ’ claims, which are based on their customary nor-
mative orders (Anaya 2004). From the perspective of state duty-bearers, 
this raises additional concerns, as now the pressure comes from two sides: 
from below (via customary norms and institutions) and from above (via 
international human rights obligations). Other authors have made similar 
observations regarding the potential association between local (indigenous/
customary) law and international human rights law. Colchester (2011: 38), 
for instance, has observed that:  ‘ Indigenous peoples are now practised at 
invoking international law to support reforms of State laws so they recog-
nise indigenous peoples ’ rights  in line with countries ’ international obliga-
tions and in ways respectful of their customary systems ’ (emphasis added). 
As concerns economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights, and more specifi -
cally subsistence rights, G ó mez Isa (2011: 60) has written that:  ‘ Some local 
cultural practices  … have a great potential for the realization of subsistence 
rights in local settings. ’ He adds that more empirical research is needed 
regarding the extent to which  ‘ local cultural practices and social arrange-
ments in the socio-economic domain  … constitute a positive input for the 
local realization of ESC rights ’ (ibid). 
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 Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that despite their overall alliance, 
international human rights law and customary normative orders (the latter, 
of course, also being internally diverse) generally do not completely coincide 
in their approaches to indigenous land, territorial and resource rights. Indig-
enous peoples generally approach nature in a holistic and spiritual way. The 
Indigenous Peoples ’ Earth Charter was drafted in the margin of the 1992 
UN Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro as a 
response to the dominance of conservationists at the event. In the Charter, 
indigenous peoples express their vision:  ‘ Our territories are living totalities 
in permanent vital relation between human beings and nature. Their pos-
session produced the development of our culture. Our territorial property 
should be inalienable, unceasable [ sic ] and not denied title ’ ( § 32). They 
defi ne their territory as including  ‘ space (air), land and sea ’ ( § 34). The 
Charter of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests of 1996 
declared that: 
 Our territories and forests are to us more than an economic resource. For us, they 
are life itself and have an integral and spiritual value for our communities. They 
are fundamental to our social, cultural, spiritual, economic and political survival 
as distinct peoples. 
 State legal systems, in contrast, usually adopt a diametrically different 
approach, whereby legislation compartmentalises the natural environ-
ment, dividing it into different sectors, including the land surface, subsoil 
resources, the water and the forests. These natural resources are then sub-
jected to divergent fi nalities (ranging from strict conservation to large-scale 
exploitation) and to different legal regimes, which are designed and moni-
tored by various — often rivalling — ministries and departments, at different 
levels (national, provincial, local). Moreover, state legislation traditionally 
focuses on (fi rst) the economic and (second) the environmental value of nat-
ural resources, attaching less importance to cultural-spiritual dimensions. 
Such fragmentation of the natural environment negates the holistic vision of 
indigenous peoples. 
 Even though international human rights law generally recognises indig-
enous land, territorial and resource rights in line with customary normative 
systems, from the perspective of indigenous peoples, it does not go  ‘ all the 
way ’ . Article 15(2) of ILO Convention 169, for instance, explicitly envisages 
the possibility that  ‘ the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface 
resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands ’ of indigenous 
peoples. Indigenous peoples must then (only) be consulted before any explo-
ration or exploitation is undertaken, and they should participate in the ben-
efi ts of such activities. With respect to water, von Benda-Beckmann (2009: 
125) has pointed to the fact that local customary water rights may be very 
extensive, whereas the human right to water only covers a small part of 
these customary water rights, namely the access to clean drinking water. 
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He concludes:  ‘ In the domain of natural resource management and land 
and water rights, local people(s) claiming human rights may end up with 
less than they would have, had they based their economic and social claims 
on their own law ’ (ibid). The overall alliance between international human 
rights law and indigenous customary orders must therefore be nuanced. 
 4. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter analysed some features of the relationship between legal 
pluralism and international human rights law, fi rst at a conceptual level, 
then in the concrete case of indigenous land, territorial and resource rights. 
Given that the term  ‘ legal pluralism ’ seems to be increasingly employed in 
relation to smaller bodies of law, it was suggested to maintain a distinction 
between a situation of  ‘ legal pluralism ’ (as referring to the  coexistence of 
different normative systems in a certain social fi eld) and  ‘ applying a legal 
pluralist perspective ’ when studying the simultaneous applicability of dif-
ferent legal norms originating from the same legal (sub)system. The  chapter 
continued with exploring the relationship between international human 
rights law and other normative orders in the domain of indigenous land, 
territorial and resource rights. It was shown that a detailed analysis of the 
interrelation between substantive norms of different normative orders is 
necessary, so as to be able to adequately assess the relationship between 
these orders. Even within one domain, no overly broad statements can be 
made as to the alliance or opposition between various normative orders. 
 
 
